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ABSTRACT 
 
Idea markets are contexts where ideas compete for attention and people to embrace them. 
They are near ubiquitous in the form of religions, political parties, securities markets and the 
blogosphere to name a few. Most idea markets are also communities where members alternate 
between being idea consumers and producers. They are thus centers for collaborative knowledge 
creation. Recent research extols the value of diverse perspectives among the members of such 
groups, however these groups tend to form based on commonality of idea preference, a basis that 
is thought to limit diversity. This study investigates whether ideal levels of cognitive diversity 
can emerge in such groups. It finds that general popularity among idea markets draws together 
people with diverse perspectives, causing ideal levels of cognitive diversity to emerge. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Google search of the term idea market yields a variety of different concepts associated 
with the term, ranging from small face-to-face brainstorming gatherings to what is more 
commonly called information or predictive markets. Predictive markets are true speculative 
markets that trade idea futures, an asset whose monetary value is usually tied to the likelihood of 
an event, like the election of a presidential candidate or the success of a new product.  
 
There is, however, a need for a term like “idea market” to describe a general context 
where ideas compete for people to embrace them, not in the sense of predicting whether they will 
eventually be shown to be true, but in the sense of being values, philosophies, opinions, beliefs 
and sentiments that are currently held as having value or meaning. Examples include the 
competition between religions, political parties, advertisements, books and weblogs for attention 
in open market systems. An idea market therefore exists to bring holders of idea preferences 
together with idea producers. 
 
Many idea markets, such as religions, political parties, and weblogs, are also idea 
communities where members alternate between being idea consumers and idea producers. This 
calls attention to the dual nature of cognitive diversity: diverse preferences and diverse thinking 
styles. Recent research extols the virtues of a multiplicity of thinking styles in groups of all kinds 
as diverse thinking leads to better collaborative outcomes. However, it is uncertain whether the 
dynamics of group formation in idea markets, the uniting of people with similar idea preferences, 
will result in a group with a diversity of thinking styles that is able to collaborate and go beyond 
merely embracing an idea to extending it.  
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This study focuses on investigating the emergence of cognitive diversity with the 
following research questions: Is there a limit to the utility of cognitive diversity? Will an idea 
market facilitate the emergence of ideal levels of cognitive diversity? What causes ideal levels of 
cognitive diversity to emerge? How can cognitive diversity be measured? To address these 
questions this study is organized as follows: first, the primary literature that relates to collective 
cognition is surveyed. Then, several variations of an agent-based model are proposed to simulate 
how agents may interact in an idea market. The results of these models are then compared to 
each other, and to observations of a sample of weblogs, drawn from one of the most active and 
diverse idea markets: the blogosphere. 
 
OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
Idea Markets 
 
A Google search of the term idea market yields a variety of different concepts associated 
with the term, ranging from small face-to-face brainstorming gatherings to Kambil’s (2003) 
description of what is more commonly called an information or predictive market. Predictive 
markets are true speculative markets that trade idea futures, an asset whose monetary value is 
usually tied to the likelihood of an event, like the election of a presidential candidate or the 
success of a new product.  
 
There is, however, a need for a term like “idea market” to describe a general context 
where ideas compete for people to embrace them, not in the sense of predicting whether they will 
eventually be shown to be true, but in the sense of being values, philosophies, opinions, beliefs 
and sentiments that are currently held as having value or meaning. One example is Warner’s 
(1993) contention that a new paradigm recently emerged among U.S. religious institutions that 
force them to compete for members in an open market system rather than as near monopolies. He 
argues that individualistic tendencies among Americans cause them to seek a church that is a 
best fit to their lifestyles and values rather than one that honors a legacy from their familial or 
cultural past.  
 
However, it is not just religious ideology that competes in an open market system. Since 
the Internet went mainstream people have used the enhanced connectivity to join and form online 
communities such as forums and weblogs, bringing together likeminded people that would never 
have met face-to-face. While search engines have been developed to help people find 
communities that closely match their interests, people also engage in a wandering process, 
sometimes aided by word-of-mouth referral from similar others, to find online communities 
wherein they feel most intellectually at home. Some seekers, passionate about their interests, 
have started their own virtual communities when their search for an ideal existing one has been 
unsuccessful. 
 
It has been noticed by many internet researchers (e.g., Shirky 2003) that the populations 
associated with virtual communities follow a power law distribution such as that shown in Figure 
1. Webb (2002) demonstrated that “power laws are characteristic of randomly distributed values 
that come from a scarce resource” and Shirky (2003) opined that in the blogosphere the scarce 
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resource was people’s time. People can only invest a limited amount of time searching for the 
ideal idea source. As a result they use means of referral, like search engines, that typically direct 
them to the most popular content that matches their search criteria. The effect of search engines 
is similar to Simon’s (1955) finding that preferential attraction creates power law behavior: 
people are attracted to that which is already most popular. Limited time and populist influences 
thus create and sustain a power law distribution in idea markets.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Power Law Profile of Idea Markets 
 
 
 
Cognitive Diversity 
 
In the previous section we described how a scarcity of time and populist influences draws 
a disproportionate number of idea-seekers to a select few idea sources. It is understandable to 
think these prominent idea sources would be very influential, however Blaser (2007), a 
prominent blogger and entrepreneur, opines that its not passive readership that confers true 
influence but active discussion, and that most of the active discussion occurs in the long tail of 
the power law, among the people who took the time to find idea sources that truly engage their 
minds. He calls this The People Law and used Figure 2 to illustrate his point. Blaser believes that 
engaged minds will go beyond merely embracing ideas and extend them, achieving true 
collaborative learning and new knowledge creation as a result. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Britt Blaser’s People Law 
 
 
 
 
The problem with seeing the small groups in the long tail as the source of true 
collaborative knowledge creation was highlighted by Scoble and Israel’s (2006) caution that 
online communities may become echo chambers, places where the high volume of conversation 
creates the illusion of cognitive diversity (i.e., the expression of ideas from diverse perspectives) 
but is really the repetition of a narrow range of similar ideas from the same group of people. This 
phenomenon has also come to be associated with cultural tribalism, a condition well described 
by Kitchin (1998): 
 
 … communities based upon interests and not localities might well reduce 
diversity and narrow spheres of influence, as like will only be communicating 
with like. As such, rather than providing a better alternative to real-world 
communities cyberspace leads to dysfunctional on-line communities … (p. 90) 
 
Cultural tribalism is thus portrayed as a highly probable equilibrium condition for all online 
communities. Since the cost of trial and switching are low, people will, over time, sample a large 
number of communities and gradually migrate to the ones wherein they feel most at home, those 
where they hear only what they want to hear. Such groups will be smaller, albeit close-knit. 
Conversation may be lively, but always among the same people, sharing a limited range of 
perspectives. Therefore, this migration to comfortable cognitive spaces should cause cognitive 
diversity, and the potential for collective knowledge creation, to be sacrificed. 
 
Recent research (e.g., Page 2007; Surowiecki 2004) extols the virtues of cognitive 
diversity (i.e., a multiplicity of perspectives) in groups of all kinds: diverse thinking leads to 
better collaborative outcomes. Page (2007) recognizes a dual nature to diversity in cognition: 
diversity in preferences and diversity in thinking styles, or as he calls them, cognitive toolboxes. 
Page also notes there is some degree of interdependence between preferences and toolboxes 
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since people develop the thinking skills needed to satisfy their preferences and then change their 
preferences based on their new ways of thinking (pp. 285-296). We are faced then with 
somewhat of a paradox: a diverse toolbox yields better outcomes, yet groups tend to self-
organize based on preference similarity, thus limiting the thinking toolbox. 
 
While preference similarity may be the primary basis on which to found a group, 
problem similarity is a factor that may help to alleviate the low cognitive diversity issue: people 
who share a problem that they cannot solve on their own are likely to seek each other out in an 
attempt to find a solution. People who come together in this manner may differ in the details of 
how they prefer their problem resolved, but those implementation details should not preclude a 
diverse group from forming to brainstorm possible solutions. Page (2007) also recognizes this 
situation: 
 
… diverse groups do perform better than homogeneous groups. And those 
situations in which they do perform better are far from random. … diverse groups 
perform better when the task is primarily problem solving, when their 
[differences] translate into relevant tools, when there is little or no preference 
diversity, and when their members get along with one another (p. 328). 
 
Page’s requirement for little preference diversity and interpersonal harmony can be relaxed if 
group members feel free and able to use the problem solution as a basis for satisfying their 
diverse preferences. In that situation, where no one anticipates a loss of satisfaction, then 
interpersonal relations should naturally be more harmonious. In the next section, past research 
into collective problem solving is related to collective learning and the argument is made that 
people with a common problem have an incentive to cooperate. 
 
Information Search and Learning 
 
Wilson (1999) proposed a problem-solving model of information seeking based on 
Kuhlthau’s (1993) model of the stages of information seeking and Ellis’ (1989) behavioral model 
of information searchers. Wilson’s model sees problem-solving as the primary motivation of 
information seeking. His model envisions seekers acting out cycles of successive searches, each 
intended to reduce uncertainty but often increasing it. Even after the current problem is solved, 
people periodically re-enter the process to solve new problems as their needs or context change.  
 
Problem-solving can be characterized as a learning activity. Even though learning is 
usually considered an individual activity, collective learning is sometimes preferable. Reynolds 
(1987) proposed flocking theory as a computational model that explains how the coordinated 
movement of a group can emerge from individuals making decisions based on personal 
information. Although flocking theory was developed as a solution to modeling the behavior of 
flocking birds and animals in computer graphics, Rosen (2002) proposed that flocking theory 
was a good explanation for self-organization in human social systems. He proposed that 
communication was the mechanism of cohesion in human society where a social network of 
individuals shares access to a collective body of knowledge that acts as a “roadmap” for 
coordinated action with little centralized control. 
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Axelrod (1984) described conditions under which normally self-seeking agents would 
cooperate when they perceived the benefits exceeded those of self-seeking. Johnson and Johnson 
(1988) developed that idea in the realm of education by describing the benefits of cooperative 
learning when individuals perceive their success to be entwined with group success. Their work 
may have been the first to describe a situation where maximizing group member heterogeneity 
was positively correlated with successful collective outcomes. By linking flocking theory with 
cooperative learning this study models a situation where individuals possess different aspects of 
the knowledge required to solve a mutual problem and thus have an incentive to cooperate. 
 
In summary, idea markets help people satisfy preferences for ideas they like to entertain 
and also help them solve problems they hold in common. Commonality in idea preferences cause 
individuals to form long term idea communities, albeit with little diversity of perspective. These 
communities, however, will attract a regular influx of problem-motivated idea-seekers that 
increase the variety of perspectives, albeit briefly, as these solution-seekers probably only stay 
long enough to have their needs met. Although they may only stay briefly, the solution-seekers 
cause the knowledge possessed by the core group to expand by requiring them to think through 
problems that will undoubtedly vary to some degree. By satisfying both the needs of those with 
idea preferences and those with problems, idea communities emerge and become stable, 
increasing, long term stores of knowledge that attract a constant influx of diverse perspectives 
with the value of their collaborative encounters. Now we turn to a discussion of the means used 
in this study to model these idea markets. 
 
Agent-based Modeling as Theory Testing 
 
This study uses agent-based modeling (ABM) to simulate a population’s search within an 
idea market. ABM is a simulation technique where a system is modeled as a collection of 
decision-making entities called agents. Agents typically move, interact and react based on a set 
of scripted behavioral rules. Some of the more advanced ABMs attempt to incorporate learning 
or evolutionary algorithms to make agent behavior increasingly better adapted to the 
circumstances of the simulation. However, even ABMs with simple agent behaviors can model 
complex interaction dynamics that are out of the reach of pure mathematical methods (Axelrod 
1997). 
 
ABM is also a way of thinking about modeling: it is a bottom-up methodology that 
describes a system as the outcome of individuals acting autonomously, rather than the result of 
system-wide laws that dictate individual behavior from the top down. As a result, it is easy to 
learn to use ABM because only the behavior of a single agent need be programmed and as many 
agents as desired can be replicated and set loose within the simulation. Many theorists (e.g., 
Bonabeau 2002; Casti 1997; Epstein & Axtell 1996) view ABM as providing the most natural 
way of modeling a system. 
 
The results of an ABM simulation can often be unexpected and counterintuitive. These 
are attributes of emergent behavior, that is, behavior resulting from interactions between 
unsynchronized autonomous entities. Such interactions are often nonlinear, sensitive to initial 
conditions and stochastic. This aspect of ABM often makes the results difficult to explain. It is 
important therefore, to be sure agent behaviors and relevant environmental conditions are 
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scripted in a manner grounded in strong theory and, if possible, consistent with empirical data. 
This three-legged stool is depicted in Figure 3, taken from Garcia, Rummel and Hauser’s (2007) 
study of history-friendly agent-based models. 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Framework for a History-Friendly Model 
 
 
 
 
Carley (1996) observed that validation, the extent to which a model is true, can have 
more than one form, depending on the model’s intended use. This study focuses on theoretical 
validity, the extent to which a model characterizes the real world and external validity, the extent 
to which simulated data matches real world data. Carley points out that most ABM research is 
obsessed with external validity as though it were the most important type of validity and its 
repeated demonstration critical to the future of ABM as a credible research tool. This emphasis 
on external validity does a disservice to ABM’s powerful utility as a means of testing theoretical 
models by revealing what Krippendorf (1986) called a behavior space: 
 
The collection of behaviors a system can follow, the set of paths a system is 
capable of taking. A behavior space represents, sometimes graphically, and/or 
abstractly, and, often within many dimensions, just what a system can do so that 
what it actually does can be seen as a special case determined by initial 
conditions. 
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When assessing external validity the initial conditions and parameters of a model are 
tuned so as to reproduce a body of empirical data. Not only is any body of empirical data, like 
any single run of a simulation, a “special case determined by initial conditions,” it is also a 
mixture of random noise and whatever effects are being measured. It is always hoped and 
assumed the effect is louder than the noise; however, we must guard against over-fitting a model 
to a dataset by adding more parameters than theory can justify. A better approach is to define the 
behavior space as a function of theory-based agent parameters, determine by simulation which 
parameters most influence the shape of the space and then locate the empirical dataset within the 
space. If the data does not fit the space, then the model is poorly specified. However, if the data 
fits within the space, we should rest content until we encounter a dataset that does not fit. 
 
Purely analytical mathematical models are, like ABMs, based on theory-grounded 
parameters, yet their validity is more readily accepted. Edmonds and Hales (2005) argue that 
while ABMs should be seen as formal models, they lack the generality of pure analytical models. 
However, purely analytical models are invariably accompanied by simplifying assumptions that 
restrict their general applicability. Edmonds and Hales’ point should be that the greater 
accessibility of ABMs makes them more susceptible for use (i.e., misuse) beyond their designed 
assumption limitations. It is wrong to label a methodology as inferior because it is easy to 
misuse. Rather, the focus should be on assessing how it was used in a research study and assess 
validity based on the consistency of its theoretical basis and the logic of its explanation for 
phenomena observed. 
 
Thus far, the discussion has been abstract. As we move forward to discuss the model used 
in this study we will refer back to this discussion and be more specific. 
 
THE MODEL AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In this section, we look back to the research questions and describe an agent-based model 
and simulation scenario designed to build on the insights past research has granted. The scenario 
described below was implemented in Wilensky’s (1999) NetLogo modeling environment 
(Version 4.0.4). A screenshot of the implementation user interface is given in Figure 42. The 
simulation takes place within a 100 by 100 cell toroidal (i.e., doughnut-shaped) information 
space. Each coordinate within the space represents a theme, thematic similarity between points in 
the space varies inversely with the Euclidean distance between the points.  
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FIGURE 4 
 
Screenshot of Simulation User Interface Implemented in NetLogo 
 
 
 
 
The space is populated with two classes of agent: information sources (or kiosks) and 
agents. Kiosks are stationary and are located at the coordinates of the theme for which they 
represent the intellectual home. Kiosks must be separated from each other by at least one cell 
within the space so they truly represent distinct themes. Now we return to the research questions: 
 
a) Is there a limit to the utility of cognitive diversity? The simulation is reset to initial 
conditions and run ten times with agent population densities (agents per information space 
cell) ranging from 10% (1000 agents) to 100% (10,000 agents) in increments of 10%. Each 
run lasts 5000 ticks, NetLogo’s time unit. These varied population levels and the long 
running interval are designed to allow some level of diversity satiation to emerge across a 
full spectrum of agent populations.  
 
b) Will an idea market facilitate the emergence of ideal levels of cognitive diversity? A 
market fundamentally brings demand in balance with supply. At the beginning of a 
simulation run, an arbitrarily low, random number of kiosks (the supply component of the 
market) is created along with a relatively large number of agents (the demand component) 
randomly distributed throughout the information space at the density associated with the run. 
Using the mechanism described for the next question, this imbalance is relieved by an 
emergent dynamic that restructures the market, turning idea consumers into producers in a 
manner similar to entrepreneurship in economic markets. 
 
c) What causes ideal levels of cognitive diversity to emerge? Agents begin wandering the 
space (Levy’s 1937 algorithm) and soon start encountering other agents, comparing thematic 
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preferences, flocking with similar others and looking for the kiosk closest to their thematic 
preference. As described in more detail below, agents unable to find preferred kiosks may 
become kiosks themselves and kiosks may revert to being agents if they cannot attract any 
agents with a matching preference. This dynamic of free migration between the states of 
thematic producer and consumer allows the optimal level of cognitive diversity to emerge 
that matches supply with demand. 
 
d) How can cognitive diversity be measured? A mixed methodologies approach, where both 
quantitative and qualitative observations are made, was taken in this study to assess measures 
and patterns in the measurement of cognitive diversity. This study views cognitive diversity 
as a latent construct that, from a quantitative perspective, must be reflectively measured in a 
variety of ways (items a through d in the list below). It also proposes that valuable insights 
can also be gained by qualitatively comparing plots of measured values (items f through g in 
the list below). 
 
a. The steady-state number of kiosks across agent density populations.  
 
b. The steady-state proportion of kiosks to agents across agent density populations.  
 
c. The mean collaborative value received by agents across kiosks for each agent density.  
 
d. The mean number of agents per kiosk for each agent density. 
 
e. The standard deviation in Euclidean distances between a kiosk’s coordinates and the 
thematic preference coordinates of its associated agents (this is a true direct measure 
of diversity unique to the simulation and unlikely to be portable to the real world). 
 
f. Qualitative comparisons of the shape of the distribution of agents across kiosks for 
each method of assessing a kiosk’s attractiveness (discussed below). 
 
g. Qualitative comparisons of the shape of the distribution of collaborative value 
received by agents across kiosks for each method of assessing a kiosk’s attractiveness 
(discussed below). 
 
h. Qualitative implications of the correlation between the number of agents associated 
with a kiosk and the total collaborative value received by these agents. 
 
Detailed Kiosk Attributes 
 
In addition to a theme, kiosks are endowed with the following attributes: 
 
a) Charisma. Weber (1947) viewed charisma as a rare trait among individuals that is 
characterized by an uncanny ability to charm and persuade. This study models agents and 
kiosks as possessing of varying degrees of charisma. Highly charismatic kiosks can seduce 
passing agents away from their search and replace it with an interest in the theme espoused 
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by the kiosk. Kiosk charisma is a random3 number between 0 and 1. In a section below, 
various kiosk attraction scenarios are described. In those that exclude charisma, the seduction 
effect is not operant. 
 
b) Associated Agents. As agents move through the space, kiosks come into their visual field. 
Agents assess the Euclidean distance between a visible kiosk’s coordinates and their thematic 
preference coordinates normalized by the length of the information space diagonal (like 
Equation 2). If that normalized distance is less than 0.5, the agent will become associated 
with that kiosk until its attention span expires or a more “attractive” kiosk pulls it away. 
Other means by which an agent may be attracted to a kiosk are discussed below. 
 
c) Mass. It is a well known phenomenon that crowds attract the curiosity of passersby. Berk 
(1974) explains this phenomenon in the first step of his rational calculus model of crowd 
action by noting that firstly, crowd members seek information. He points out that those recent 
arrivals to a crowd will begin by talking to other agents, probably asking: “What’s going on 
here?” Thus, as partly explained in the discussion of charisma above and in greater detail 
below, this crowd attractiveness around a kiosk is one of six ways mass is modeled in this 
study. In that scenario, the charisma of a kiosk and the charisma of the agents associated with 
it, give a kiosk its mass, its attractive power, modeled as a gravitational fixed-point attractor, 
able to draw passing agents. 
 
d) Collaborative Value. Gilder (1993) introduced the concept of Metcalfe’s Law: “the 
systematic value of compatibly communicating devices grows as the square of their number.” 
Bob Metcalfe’s original statement of this “law,” in a slide presentation sometime in the 
1980’s, referred specifically to communication technology like fax machines. Gilder 
expanded the definition by substituting “users” for “compatibly communicating devices,” 
thus making Metcalfe’s Law relevant to the context of social networks and collaboration. 
Odlyzko and Tilly (2005) argued that Metcalfe’s Law overestimated the value of adding 
connections to a network by observing that not all connections in a network are equally 
valuable. They suggest the true value is better estimated by “n times the logarithm of n.” This 
study, as a part of its mission, compares the results of modeling attractive mass (described 
above) as a function of crowd size with mass as a function of the collaborative value received 
by the agents associated with a kiosk and mass due to preference similarity. Odlyzko and 
Tilly’s equation is used as the basis for calculating collaborative value (V) as shown in 
Equation 1. 
 
(1)      V = nc ln nc  
 
Where nC is the effective number of collaborators. Consistent with the theoretical discussion, 
the probability of two agents collaborating is inversely proportional to the distance between 
their thematic preference coordinates. However, the value of such collaboration varies 
directly with the distance between their thematic preference coordinates. Potential 
collaborators are filtered by likelihood of collaboration; then, the effective number of 
collaborators reflects the relative value of their collaboration as calculated by Equation 2. 
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Where dij is the Euclidean distance between two collaborating agents’ thematic preferences 
and dD is the length of the diagonal of the information space. Dividing the inter-agent 
thematic distance by the maximum distance in the space normalizes all inter-agent thematic 
distances between 0 and 1. The value of collaboration is thus higher when the agents are 
cognitively different, as represented by the distance between their thematic preferences4. 
 
Detailed Agent Attributes 
 
Agents are mobile and represent seekers of information on a preferred theme. They are 
created with a random thematic preference expressed as a coordinate within the space, although 
the agent’s behavior is not scripted to be aware the information space has coordinates. In 
addition to a preferred theme, agents are endowed with the following attributes: 
 
a) Charisma. Like kiosks, agents are assigned charisma as a random number between 0 and 1. 
High charisma increases the probability an agent will become a kiosk if it cannot find a kiosk 
that matches its preferred theme. As described above, the charisma of agents crowding 
around a kiosk add to the attractive mass of a kiosk in one of the scenarios modeled. 
 
b) Attention span. Attention span is modeled as a decrementing counter; initially set to a 
random value less than 1000. When the counter reaches zero any agent searching for a kiosk 
has a probability equal to its charisma of becoming a kiosk located at its preferred thematic 
preference coordinates. If there is already a kiosk at those coordinates, nearby locations, no 
closer than one cell from any existing kiosk are searched until an acceptable location is 
found. 
 
c) Impressionability. When an agent is passing by a highly charismatic or high mass kiosk 
there is a probability equal to one minus its impressionability that it will be attracted to that 
kiosk and have its preferred theme replaced by that of the kiosk. Impressionability is a 
random value between 0 and 1. In simulation scenarios that do not use charisma, 
impressionability has no effect and agents change thematic preference only when their 
attention span expires. 
 
d) Range of vision. Agents are given a circular field of vision with a radius randomly set 
between 5 and 10 cells around its current coordinates. Agents look for kiosks with similar 
theme and other agents with similar thematic preferences within their field of vision. Agents 
will crowd around kiosks or flock with any similar agents found.  
 
                                               
4
 This may seem like “double accounting.” Odlyzko and Tilly (2005) focus on network failures to interoperate, 
assessing collaborative value without considering diversity of perspective. Since that is one of this study’s central 
tenants, diversity of perspective is piggy-backed on the factors they include. This approach may be open to the 
criticism of being overly conservative. 
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e) Happiness. Agent happiness is generally assessed as one minus the Euclidean distance 
between its physical coordinates and its thematic preference coordinates. In the next section, 
various models of kiosk attraction are discussed. One of those models, collaboration-value-
based attraction, calculates happiness as the mean between the Euclidean distance just 
described and the collaboration value the agent receives normalized between 0 and 1. This 
change in the way happiness is calculated recognizes that idea market participants may 
forego happiness based on exercising their personal preferences so they can participate in 
helping their community, typically another source of happiness.  
 
Kiosks as Single-Point Attractors 
 
As agents move about the information space they are subject to the attractive forces of 
kiosks. This attraction force is modeled as a single point attractor exerting gravitational force 
proportional to its mass as described by Equation 3. An agent has a negligible mass of 1. 
 
 
 
Where F is the force of attraction, G is a constant (set here at 0.5), m1 is the mass of the kiosk 
(already described, but discussed in greater detail below) , m2 is the mass of an agent (always 1) 
and r is the physical or thematic preference distance between agent and kiosk depending on the 
mass behavior scenario being run.  
 
The simulations were run with six mass behavior scenarios: 
 
1. Crowd Attraction with Charisma. As already mentioned, charisma is an indicator of 
individual attractiveness and crowds also have a magnetic quality, enhanced by the charisma 
of their members. The mass of a kiosk is therefore calculated as its own charisma added to 
the sum of the charisma of each agent associated with it. 
 
2. Crowd Attraction without Charisma. The mass of the kiosk is simply the number of agents 
associated with the kiosk. 
 
3. Value Attraction with Charisma. As already discussed, the total value agents receive from 
their collaboration with other agents associated with the same kiosk is a measure of the value 
of a kiosk’s collaboration environment and of the kiosk itself. Here, the mass of a kiosk is 
calculated to be the sum of its charisma (as an initial, kick-starting attraction) and the total 
value received by the associated agents. 
 
4. Value Attraction without Charisma. The mass of the kiosk is simply the total collaboration 
value received by the associated agents. 
 
5. Preference Attraction with Charisma. The mass behavior scenarios described above all use 
aggregated measures (crowd size and total kiosk collaboration value) to set a kiosk mass that 
is uniformly applied to all passing agents. This scenario calculates a unique force of 
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attraction based on the thematic distance between the kiosk and a passing agent: the closer 
the thematic distance the greater the attractive force. Mass is calculated as the sum of kiosk 
charisma and ten times one minus the thematic distance between kiosk and agent. 
 
6. Preference Attraction without Charisma. Mass is calculated as ten times one minus the 
thematic distance between kiosk and agent. 
 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
In the discussion of agent-based modeling it was stated that one of the goals of this study 
was external validity, which is, comparing the simulation results with empirical data. While there 
are many idea markets, the blogosphere was selected for this study primarily due to the similarity 
of its structure to the simulation environment where content posted to a weblog (blog author 
entries and comments) are like kiosks and weblog readers like agents. Another selection factor 
was the ease of obtaining data concerning its growth characteristics, and the popularity and 
informational value ascribed to individual weblogs. On a quarterly basis, Technorati, a weblog 
search engine, publishes its State of the Blogosphere  report containing a graph of the number of 
weblogs since March 2003. The graph from the latest report (Figure 5) is qualitatively compared 
with the pattern of growth in kiosks observed in this simulation (Sifry 2007). 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Is there a limit to the utility of cognitive diversity? 
 
Figure 6 indicates that the simulation showed consistent levels of satiation in the number 
of kiosks demanded by an agent population. Figure 7 (a) shows this satiation is robust across 
different population levels. Interestingly, Figure 7 (b) seems to show that the number of kiosks 
demanded per agent levels off to a constant proportion as the size of groups increase. This 
implies that the utility of cognitive diversity is higher in small groups where the probability of 
randomly assembling a maximized diversity of perspectives is lower.  
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FIGURE 6 
 
Kiosks Emergent over Time (Density = 0.1) 
 
 
Figure 6 should be compared with Figure 5, the graph of the blogosphere’s growth. It 
seems that the growth of the blogosphere has evolved to assume an s-shaped or logistic form, 
having passed an inflection point in its early exponential growth, its growth is slowing, trending 
toward a peak. The simulated model’s behavior differs from the blogosphere in that the model’s 
early kiosk growth rate was faster. The real world was slower to demand new weblogs than the 
model demanded new kiosks. However, once the inflection point was reached in the 
blogosphere’s growth pattern, the patterns in the simulation and the blogosphere became similar. 
 
It is interesting to note in Figure 6, that the satiation level differed across the ways in 
which kiosk attractive mass was modeled, most dramatically between collaboration-value-based 
mass and the other two ways of modeling attraction. If the simulation correctly models human 
behavior, the implication is that people forego the satisfaction of their preferences if the value 
they receive from collaboration is high enough and they perceive this value to be a primary goal. 
By foregoing individual preference the demand for diversity is reduced thus creating fewer 
kiosks. This may be modeling a situation where the wants of individuals are sacrificed for the 
good of a community. 
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FIGURE 7 (a) and (b) 
 
Kiosk Emergence Curves 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
 
Do idea markets cause ideal levels of cognitive diversity to emerge? 
 
As already described, this study uses a direct measure of cognitive diversity tightly 
coupled to the design of the simulation: the standard deviation in Euclidean distance between a 
kiosk’s coordinates and the thematic preference coordinates of its associated agents. Figure 8 
shows a scatter plot of this cognitive diversity metric for kiosks ordered by population 
(descending) that is robust across densities and mass attraction models. Even though a poorly 
fitted regression line shows a slight decrease in cognitive diversity into the tail of the 
distribution, the mean level of diversity in each kiosk is very close to being uniform. The 
difference in cognitive diversity among the kiosks is really a matter of consistency: the more 
populated kiosks have greater consistency in diversity. A similar story is told by Figure 9, where 
the mean number of agents associated with a kiosk approaches the same value regardless of the 
mass attraction model used. It is also interesting to note from Figure 9 that a collaboration-value-
based attraction model finds what seems to be an ideal kiosk population level faster. 
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FIGURE 8 
 
Agent Cognitive Diversity across Kiosks 
 
 
Why does this simulation exhibit the power laws of real idea markets? 
 
It was already mentioned that Shirky (2003) attributes the blogosphere’s power law 
behavior to a scarcity of time among readers, an effect that may be facilitated (or exasperated) by 
search engines that tend to refer people to the most popular weblogs. The simulations in this 
study do not model time scarcity, they distribute preference uniformly among agents, and yet 
they display power-law-like behavior. This is probably due to the influence of modeling kiosks 
as single-point attractors, the influence of charisma and the use of flocking in the agent’s search 
process, a conclusion consistent with Simon’s (1955) preferential attraction mechanism. The 
interesting insight is that single-point attractors seem ubiquitous, not only in the realm of physics 
but in social systems as well. 
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FIGURE 9 
 
Mean Agents per Kiosk 
 
 
Does preference-based attraction undermine cognitive diversity? 
 
It was mentioned that Page (2007) recognized a dual nature to diversity in cognition: 
diversity in preferences and diversity in thinking styles and that groups tend to form based on 
preference commonality to the detriment of diverse thinking. This section presents evidence to 
suggest that the ubiquitous presence of single point attractors in idea markets cause diverse 
groups to form in spite of agents’ thematic preferences. Figure 10 shows a power-law-like curve 
of the authority or value assigned to the top 100 most cited weblogs ordered in descending order 
of value. Figure 11 shows the same weblogs ordered by value, but indicates their popularity 
among Technorati members. The two value sets have a correlation of 0.686 (ρ < 0.001). While 
this indicates a moderate degree of similarity, the substantial difference justifies this study’s 
differentiation between attraction due to value from that due to preference. Figure 10 echoes the 
pattern of Figure 1, the typical power law associated with the blogosphere. Figure 12 shows a 
similar pattern in collaboration value as modeled in this study, this general power law shape is 
characteristic of all collaboration value ordering of kiosks regardless of the mass attraction 
model used. So both the blogosphere and the simulation show preference diversity differs from 
thinking style diversity but not enough to be mutually exclusive. 
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FIGURE 10 
 
 
FIGURE 11 
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FIGURE 12 
 
 
Figure 13 is a typical scatter plot of the happiness attribute values of agents associated 
with kiosks ordered by collaboration value. As already discussed, happiness is generally 
calculated from proximity to the preferred thematic location and agents were created with 
thematic preferences sampled from a uniform distribution. This explains why the model shows a 
near-uniform distribution of happiness. It is however, interesting to note that happiness levels are 
more consistent where collaboration values are highest than in the tail of the collaboration value 
curve. The dissimilarity between Figures 14 and 13 is loosely comparable to the difference 
observed in the real blogosphere between Figures 10 and 11. More striking is the similarity 
between Figures 11 and 13. The preference ratings of weblogs ordered by collaboration value 
were best-fit by a logarithmic curve (Figure 11) that approximated the shape of the power law in 
Figure 10, albeit with a lot of noise. In Figure 13, agent happiness was calculated as based on 
two factors: preference satisfaction and collaborative value received. Although Figure 13 has a 
more linear pattern, its negative slope is similar to the downward concave curve shown in Figure 
11, implying that readers in the blogosphere may include the utility they receive from the 
authority of weblogs in their assessment of their favorite weblogs. So, although collaborative 
value and preference satisfaction are distinct in this study, these constructs may be related in the 
real world. 
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FIGURE 13 
 
Agent Happiness across Kiosks 
 
 
 
FIGURE 14 
 
Agent Cognitive Diversity across Kiosks 
 
 
 22
 
Let us revisit Blaser’s (2007) speculations, depicted in Figure 2: interactions are richer in 
the tail of the blogosphere. We noted in the previous paragraph that the weblogs conferred with 
the highest collaboration value are often the most favored weblogs. In this study, the kiosks with 
the most agents are also the kiosks with the highest collaboration value (compare Figures 15 (a) 
and (b)); there is a 0.8 to 0.9 statistically significant correlation between these two value sets, 
robust across all agent densities and mass attraction models. Also, while Figure 8 shows a 
roughly uniform level of cognitive diversity across kiosks (also robust across densities and mass 
attraction models), the kiosks with the most agents have more consistent levels of cognitive 
diversity while the kiosks in the tail have some of the most diverse as well as some of the least 
diverse agent sets.  
 
FIGURE 15 (a) and (b) 
 
Variations in Population and Collaborative Value across Kiosks 
 
(a) (b) 
 
 
In Figure 14, the scatter plot of agent cognitive diversity across kiosks ordered by 
collaboration value revealed a similar pattern to Figure 8: consistent diversity among the kiosks 
with the highest collaboration value, less consistency among kiosks with lower collaboration 
value. If this simulation is accurately modeling the way real idea markets behave, and some 
evidence has been presented indicating it does, then Blaser’s (2007) ideas about “The People 
Law” cannot be supported. 
 
Final Conclusions 
 
In this study, all the models of mass attraction yielded similar levels of cognitive 
diversity. However, as Figures 16 and 17 shows, collaborative-value-based attraction yielded 
lesser levels of collaborative value. This is attributed to the results shown in Figure 16, where 
 23
collaborative-value-based attraction created smaller groups in the initial part of the simulation 
run. Both preference-based attraction and crowd attraction are easy to implement in the real 
world as the idea seeker always has knowledge of personal preference and can easily identify 
crowds that might call attention to something interesting. Collaboration-value-based attraction 
demands an extra interpersonal communication step where the seeker asks other seekers: How 
much does belonging to this group benefit you? The problem is further compounded by the need 
to assume all seekers value ideas in the same way in order to preserve some level of simplicity to 
the scenario. Crowd attraction may be a hard-wired adaptation that, in an organically simple 
way, brings people together around issues of general interest to ensure a high level of cognitive 
diversity will be present in order to make good decisions.   
 
FIGURE 16 
 
Collaboration Value over Time 
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FIGURE 17 
 
Collaboration Value across Kiosks (Value-Based Attraction) 
 
 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Previous research has found that the more people collaborate the more their mental 
models converge (e.g., Jeong and Chi 2007). Perhaps similar mental models homogenize 
problem-solving perspectives; so the longer people collaborate, the less the value of their 
collaboration. It seems that if thought diversity is better than uniformity there should be some 
sort of adaptive behavior that periodically or contingently perturbs situations where collaborative 
value has stagnated at minimal levels. Are individuals able to discern that the value of 
collaboration with some group has waned? Is that boredom? Does this realization reduce the 
attractiveness of a particular group, even to the extent of repulsion, driving people apart so they 
can, in a kind of reproductive isolation, develop their perspectives in diverging directions and 
thereby restore the potential for collaborative value? Or, is cognitive diversity maintained by 
continually shuffling group memberships, mingling individuals in a myriad of unique random 
combinations? How does comfort with the familiar, preference matching and boredom avoidance 
interact as behavioral forces?
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